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Innovation, Markets, and Evolution

Mitch Green
Honors Thesis
June 11th 2010
Abstract:
This paper approaches innovation from an evolutionary perspective. Literature spanning a
broad range of traditions in economics is considered, to include Institutionalist, Schumpeterian,
post-Keynesian, and growth theorists. Key systemic changes are examined in the context of
prevailing technological and social institutions. It is argued that expectation-fixing effects such
as path-dependence in investment and innovation provide structure to a social network of
market institutions that seek to validate money contracts. The institution of money is
considered as a center of power in the system and affects the course of innovation. Money as
the unit of account becomes the object of desire in a system of monetary production.
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Introduction
Robert Heilbroner's description of economics as The Worldly Philosophy could not be more
insightful. For Heilbroner, economics presents a system of thought that seeks to categorize and explain
the behavior not of heavenly gods, but rather worldly men. The ―propensity to truck, barter and trade 1‖
reflects the being which must apply clever tricks to avoid the cold indifference of nature. In this way,
economics is inextricably linked to the study of human ingenuity. This unique trait has allowed Homo
sapiens to bend the constraints of its physical environment. Unlike any other species, which evolve as
a whole population through a stochastic process of natural selection with respect to a particular habitat,
humans apply learned techniques in an effort to change conditions to fit the needs of the group, and by
extension the species. As well as passive adaptation through variation in offspring, humans possess the
art of tool manipulation – an active process that increases the likelihood of group survival.
Anthropological evidence confirms the importance of innovation in techniques through cultural
artifacts, placing innovation at the center of humanity.
This paper seeks to explain key aspects of the role of innovation in the history of economic
thought, with a particular focus on money as both a force that shapes the evolution of dynamic
processes and the object of inventive activity. Moreover, this inquiry strives to further our
understanding of innovation through an analysis of its linkages to the economic processes which drive
systemic evolution. In a world where time flows in only one causal direction, changes in technology
today forever alter the future conditions that underlie a large economic system. Further, changes
reverberate throughout the system in an ongoing process of cumulative causation, creating a non-

1

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
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deterministic future highly sensitive to the initial conditions of the emergent state. The concept of
cumulative causation is a key insight into the dynamic, evolutionary nature of economic systems,
which institutional economists have brought to high level of refinement. Thorstein Veblen in, ―Why is
Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?‖ (1898, pg. 139) frames the problem at hand:
―The ways and means, material and immaterial, by which the native proclivities work out their ends,
therefore, are forever in a process of change, being conditioned by the changes cumulatively going
forward in the institutional fabric of habitual elements that govern the scheme of life.‖

Hall and Whybrow (2008) argue that Veblen’s emphasis on the interplay between the ―material and
immaterial‖ reconciles economics as a science with the philosophy of evolutionary change 2.
The importance of a new technique, tool or process within the larger cultural and social milieu is of
profound interest if we are to reconcile notions of progress and change in terms of the market. Veblen
again makes this point in his own words:
―What is true of the individual in this respect is true of the group in which he lives. All economic
change is a change in the economic community – a change in the community’s methods of turning
material things to account. The change is always in the last resort a change in habits of thought. A given
contrivance for effecting certain material ends becomes a circumstance which affects the further growth
of habits of thought – habitual methods of procedure – and so becomes a point of departure for further
development of methods of compassing the ends sought and for the further variation of ends that are
sought to be compassed.‖

Veblen shows that innovation in the ―community’s methods of ―turning material things to
account ―(italics added for emphasis) – a change in the mode of production per se – results in an

2

Hall and Whybrow connect Veblen’s conception of cumulative causation with the
synechist approach C.S. Peirce, a father of the Pragmatist School.
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alteration of society’s institutional ―habits of thought.‖ Moreover, these changes set the stage for a
permanent departure from the present state. From here we may envisage innovation in its larger,
evolutionary societal context.
This analysis draws upon the insights of several schools of thought within the economics
discipline in order to establish a framework capable of integrating innovation into the large set of
economic processes. We begin with the recognition that economic systems evolve over time in a
process which remains non-teleological in nature. In other words, we are concerned with a system that
changes through time based upon the cumulative interaction of its constituent elements, steered through
time by historical precedent, not by rational conceptions of natural, immutable states of equilibrium.
Historical events -themselves the consequence of an earlier set of conditions — serve to shape the
nature of emergent states. The interplay between the present situation constrained both by the physical
world and social institutions, and the reaction of the same in the form of innovation, reverberate in a
feedback loop of causality. The evolutionary conception of change places innovation in a dual role as
both a reflection of the violence of social change and cause for further adaptation.
An evolutionary approach to innovation must consider the contribution of Joseph Schumpeter
on the subject of the business cycle. Schumpeter's (1934) seminal work The Theory of Economic
Development embeds innovation within a larger, evolutionary context that seeks to account for the
dynamic forces that provide the bittersweet creative destruction of progress. Schumpeter (1934, pg.
58) argues the emergent state of an economic system must be understood in terms of the previous state
of the entire system, not just those elements commonly regarded as economic. The force for
Schumpeterian change springs forth from innovations made successful by the entrepreneur, accounting
for the change in the business cycle along with a new era of investment activity. Through new
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combinations of technique and finance, innovations emerge to reshape the circular flow of resources
economy wide.
As Schumpeter (1934, pg. 64) meticulously stresses, the processes working to reshape the
circular flow of the economy emerge endogenously from within the system. While defining economic
development, Schumpeter leaves us with this famous insight into the cumulative effect of endogenous
change:
―...what we are about to consider is that kind of change arising from within the system and which so
displaces its equilibrium point that the new one cannot be reached from the old one by infinitesimal
steps. Add successively as many mail coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby.‖
(author’s italics)

Thus, Schumpeter lays out the importance of uncertainty and time in explaining economic
change. The inherent complexity in the social system of production suggests an infinite range of
possible emergent states, all distinctly representative of innovations upon the original state. Therefore,
accidents of history which led to, for example, the development of the key constituents of railroad
technology – e.g. steel production, the steam engine, eminent domain – jointly determine the path of
innovation. Successive improvement and diffusion of the mail coach does not imply convergence
towards the railroad.
In order to conceptualize the dynamic processes affecting the manner and nature of innovation
through history, we employ the Social System of Accumulation framework developed within the recent
neo-Marxist literature. Emanating from the seminal work of David Gordon, Richard Edwards and
Michael Reich (1982), Social Structure of Accumulation (hereafter SSA) theory attempts to explain
long-wave cycles of capitalist history. SSA theory points to distinct periods of accumulation and
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stagnation to a holistic arrangement of institutional factors, which provide periods of relative stability.
Moreover, the particular network of institutional factors which constitute the SSA break down over
time, giving way to a period of stagnation and the dissolution of that particular structure. As the market
undergoes a new period of expansion and accumulation, a new SSA emerges to carry on in a new
period of relative stability.
Additionally, our analysis integrates the role of money in the form and function of the SSA as a
stabilizing set of institutions. This approach adopts the post-Keynesian (PK) formulation of
endogenous money theory (EMT), which presents a systematic approach to explaining how flows of
credit money through the economy affect production. While we touch on some of the key concepts of
EMT in our treatment of innovation under the organizing effect of a SSA, a thorough exposition of the
heterodox theory of money shall be dealt with in Part 4.
Traditionally, mainstream economics takes a narrow view of the importance of innovation in
accounting for growth and change. This is not to suggest that orthodoxy ignores the effect of
innovation on economic change, only that they hold technological change as separate from the material
lives of human beings and their overall relation with the production process. This distinction relegates
innovation as an exogenous effect on the larger economic system. In contemporary literature,
innovation results in changes in total factor productivity, so that processes that account for changes in
the production process are lost in the ―black box‖ of the residual to the two pillars of growth that are
capital and labor.

While efforts have been made to break open the ―black box‖ of innovation, much

of the importance of the innovation process itself has been ignored. However, recent research in the
literature that focuses on innovation offers promise for new revelations on the endogeneity of
innovation led growth.
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Despite the reluctance to embrace an evolutionary approach to methodology, neoclassical
growth literature has produced a robust and wide-ranging body of knowledge pertaining to the
determinants of the Industrial Revolution. Several explanations seeking to establish a causal
foundation for the onset and timing of the Industrial Revolution are considered within the growth
literature, such as the role of religion and history.
Joel Mokyr provides a framework for understanding the process of innovation from an
epistemological approach. Mokyr proposes that changes in technology result from an interplay
between propositional knowledge and prescriptive knowledge. Mokyr defines propositional knowledge
as the set of all ―useful information,‖ to include science, philosophy, religion and other habits of
thought. Essentially, propositional knowledge serves to create an epistemological basis for culture;A
ready pool of insight into future contemplation. Prescriptive knowledge refers to information relating
to technique. The production of flour via the windmill serves as an example of prescriptive knowledge.
Knowledge that the windmill operates in accordance with the weather can be categorized as
propositional knowledge. The distinction lies in applicability.
Part one of this paper explores the role of innovation in bringing about the Industrial
Revolution, as an example of an era of innovation to which economists have paid a great deal of
attention. Through Mokyr’s framework we divide the Industrial Revolution into periods possessing
distinct relations between propositional and prescriptive knowledge. First we show that inventions
prior to 1800 were characteristic of an era that lacked the epistemic maturity to embrace innovation as
an integral process in the economic system. Mokyr points out, often inventions emerged despite a lack
of understanding of its fundamental, physical properties. Following 1800, advances in the natural
sciences allowed for a wider base of knowledge enabling innovation based upon deliberate, scientific
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engineering.
In addition to the emergence of major technological innovation, the Industrial Revolution
hosted cultural innovation through institutional change. Central changes include the emergence of
legal establishing well-defined property rights, and the enforcement of contract. The emergence of the
factory as an organizing principle in society becomes an important determinant of change.
Additionally, the factory creates a demand for capital intensive innovation.
In part two we introduce SSA Theory. We shall argue that SSAs serve to stabilize expectations
of firms with regard to the future determination of prices and profits, allowing sophisticated planning at
the organizational level. Contrary to the notion that firms simply respond to the sovereign will of the
consumer through market signals, which holds for production of simple, low tech commodities for the
market during the Laissez Faire era, the behavior of firms in the wake of the Industrial Revolution
suggests the need to orchestrate production to reflect perceived conditions in the future. The Industrial
Revolution brought to bear on the market the sort of innovations – e.g. the railroad, electrical
production, etc. - which heralded an age of goods produced using large-scale heavy capital. Capital
intensive production implies a considerable degree of risk which must be attenuated in order to induce
investment well ahead of prospective profits.
We shall explore the connections between the institutionally determined, expectations-fixing
effects consistent with the SSA approach as well as the post-Keynesian conception of endogenous
money theory, in order to explain the nature of innovation during the 20 th Century3. It shall be argued
that the result is a tendency towards path-dependence in investment and capital formation.
In part three of this inquiry we examine institutional innovation, in light of the philosophical
3

Here I propose expectations-fixing to be a quality of certain effects, devices or techniques
which stabilize the outlook of an uncertain future.
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insights of John Dewey and the theoretical implications of path-dependence, as it relates to social
milieu. The central argument of this section is the notion that institutional innovation results in an
asymmetrical distribution of effective power within social networks4 , resulting in a nexus of rigid
institutions that seek to preserve the existing order. We shall examine this effect and discuss some of
the central challenges of technological improvements that make possible further access to the social
network, in the absence of requisite institutional adaptation.
Part 4 examines the role money plays in a market economy and its effect on innovation. The
post-Keynesian conception of money starts with a rejection of the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM).
Chief proponents of this approach argue that the QTM is suitable merely as an accounting tool to
measure in money terms what is essentially a barter economy. Since the market is not a barter
economy, but rather a monetary economy, the central tenet of the QTM - the supposed neutrality of
money principle - fails to hold. In a monetary system of production, nominal interest rates matter, as
well as the means by which liquidity is supplied to those requiring it.
Money plays a special role in the larger study of innovation through history of our socioeconomic system, where major innovations enter the market through the creation of credit and the
establishment of forward contracts based upon expected flows of revenue. This thesis argues that
money is the most important institution in a social system that organizes production and distribution
through market based institutions. L. Randall Wray (2006, pg. 185) points to a key revelation by
Keynes that a central determinant of the manner in which money flows through the economy, stems
from the uneasiness implied by an uncertain future; possession of cold, hard cash ―lulls our

4

Effective power in this case refers to the relative influence a central node
exerts over the network.
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disquietude.‖ In turn the rate of return on an asset that requires one to surrender that liquidity, offers
some base indication of the level of anxiety associated with the possibility that unforeseen events will
render the investor insolvent.
At an economy wide scale, the cumulative effect of individual desires to hoard money may
prevent investment at levels that fully employ the resources of the economy. Under these conditions,
the scope and nature of innovation and its diffusion through the economy reflects the desire to create
inventive ways of ensuring a necessary level of liquidity to validate liability structures through the time
schedule of a set of annuities. Once money reaches a stage of institutional primacy, it undergoes a
process of innovation as it evolves under the influence of the market demand for liquidity.
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Part 1: Innovation During the Industrial Revolution
Economists have long pondered the questions: Why did the Industrial Revolution occur when it
did, and for what reason? Several schools of thought have sought to solve the problem. Mokyr (1985,
pp. 3-5) identifies four schools of thought on the subject of the Industrial Revolution: The Social
Change School, Industrial Organization School, Macroeconomic School, and the Technological School.
We shall briefly example each approach in turn. The Social Change School emphasize the role of
major institutional shifts in bringing about conditions amenable to market production. The emergence
of the market itself ushered provided conditions of the burst of innovation typical of the Industrial
Revolution. Second, The Industrial Organization School argues that size and scale of the firm in the
pursuit of industrial production was a key determinant during the period. Mokyr suggests that the
Macroeconomic School follows in the tradition of Kuznets through their emphasis on aggregate
variable. While this study is concerned with macro-effects of innovation on social change we are less
concerned with aggregate macro variables here. Lastly, the Technological School suggests that changes
in technique account the period of magnificent innovation.
More broadly we argue that an epistemological approach explains the processes characteristic
of major systemic change. The aim of this section is to analyze the Industrial Revolution in terms of
the innovative process. The innovative process consists of the interplay between propositional
knowledge5 and prescriptive knowledge6, where the former provides an epistemic base7 by which the

5
6

7

Set of all knowledge held of science, myth, philosophy, etc.
The information describing a technique or set of instructions. An invention is
a new element of prescriptive knowledge.
Epistemic base refers to the scope of a knowledge within a social network.
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latter may rest. This base can be thought of as a measure of certainty in adopting a new technique.
Additionally, the ―width‖ of the epistemic base implies a level of cost in its accession as well as the
reliability of the technique. It is argued that Mokyr's knowledge framework effectively shows the
dynamic nature of innovation during the Industrial Revolution.
Mokyr divides the Industrial Revolution into two distinct periods: Pre and post 1800. The
former is regarded as period in which the epistemic base of propositional knowledge was insufficient in
providing emergent prescriptive knowledge an environment where it might gain permanence. As a
result many micro-innovations lacked a necessary level of diffusion required to become a stable part of
the system. Likewise, Mokyr argues that innovations emerging in the latter period found stability in
respectively wider epistemic bases, allowing for wider diffusion of the knowledge embodied in
emergent technique.
We shall consider both periods of innovation as presented by Joel Mokyr in the context of the
Industrial Revolution. Additionally, we attempt to describe the role of culture in determining the rate of
innovation.
Innovation prior to 1800
Before 1800 the base of propositional knowledge was too narrow to support the widespread
diffusion of many innovations. Mokyr (2002, pg. 19) argues that innovations in technique prior to 1800
typically lack a sufficiently large base of awareness in science and philosophy to support its sustained
implementation. More specifically, the reliability of propositional knowledge and its ability to
correctly evaluate the performance of a technique had not yet reached the level required to develop the
type of innovation likely to invite further, sustained and responsive micro-innovation. In other words,
Narrow implies majority ignorance of some possible knowledge.
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in the absence of a solid working set of useful knowledge of the governing forces of the natural world,
a technique would likely fail to invite further improvements, due to a lack of understanding of the
practical nature of the innovation in the first place. Additionally, with a limited epistemic base for a
particular innovation, non-scientific attempts frequently yielded negative, costly results.
In an uncertain world where people must hedge against an unknowable future, ―tightness‖ of
knowledge in the propositional base serves to attenuate the perception of risk. As the gains in science
are proven in marvelous of human engineering, the reliability of propositional knowledge increases. In
a market economy liquidity is required to secure the desired flow of resources for consumption or
production needs. Therefore, any commitment of resources to an endeavor – such as undertaking
process innovation – carries a degree of risk that the outcome of the application of the innovation might
result in a failure to increase productivity, thereby rendering it difficult to maintain the desired level of
liquidity. An innovation in technique is always an undertaking involving a considerable degree of risk,
since the extant set of techniques remains ready for combination with the capital instead committed to
innovation.
The Industrial Revolution rests on the shoulders of what Mokyr (2002, pg. 35) defines as the
Industrial Enlightenment. The Industrial Enlightenment can be described as those elements of the
Enlightenment that account for an expansion to the set of knowledge practical for the pursuit of
industry. Mokyr (2002, pg. 84) points to advances in thermodynamics, geology, mechanics, hydraulics,
electromagnetism, and soil science as elements of the Industrial Enlightenment. Further, Mokyr (2002,
pg. 37) suggests that the spillover effects from scientific activity during the period created a culture,
mindset and set of methods all embodied in the pursuit of science, thrusting knowledge into the public
domain. The collaborative, peer-reviewed nature of the scientific method serves to make the claims of
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the scientist public, resulting in the creation of a public good from the scientific process. As a nondepleting good the access costs of scientific information diffused more rapidly throughout
communication networks, swelling the epistemic base for future technological evolution.
Communication networks emerged to connect scientific ideas to the minds of practical
engineers. In response to the advances in the natural sciences, Mokyr (2002, pg. 45) argues that there
was a growing urge to share the information freely. Institutions such as The Society of Arts in 1754 and
the Royal Institute in 1799, serve as examples of efforts to take knowledge and place it in the public
domain. These institutions performed the function of reconciling science with common experience
through language and expression. The presentation of scientific findings takes on a role of cultural
significance; the ritual becomes the basis by which the fidelity of subsequent innovation rests.
Additionally, standardization in measurement and mathematical precision allowed scientists to
collaboratively engage in inquiry within networks capable of further diffusion.
Innovation post 1800
Increases in the vast library of propositional knowledge following 1800 marks a change in the
process of innovation. Beginning in 1860 what Mokyr (2002, pg. 85) calls the Second Industrial
Revolution frames a period of where innovation was the result of deliberate, applied science. The
techniques had the advantage of tight epistemic bases resulting in sustained micro-innovation. Major
innovations were now possible in light of advancements in the physical sciences and mathematics.
Furthermore, wider diffusion of innovations are possible thanks to the billowing effect of the
presentation of scientific proceedings in the public forum.
Major innovations were made possible by a widened base of propositional knowledge. Mokyr
(2002, pg. 86) offers as a prime example the Bessemer process of 1856. By then advancements in
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chemistry were sufficient to provide Henry Bessemer, and other process innovators, with the insight to
identify the causal linkages present in the very techniques under experimentation. While Bessemer's
approach did not start with the goal of adjusting the carbon content to produce steel, he certainly
recognized that it his blasting process was responsible for achieving the desired results. Moreover,
Mokyr (1990, pg. 116) highlights the importance of the broad base of available knowledge as a
determinant in the ongoing evolution of an emergent technique, by pointing to the refinement of
Bessemer's process by the British steelmaker Robert Mushet. Accessible knowledge in chemistry
allowed Mushet to discover that an alloy of manganese, iron, and molten ore served as a recarburizer,
adding much needed quality to the cheap steel developed with the Bessemer process.
In similar fashion, refinements in thermodynamics allowed engineers to understand how the
engine worked, not simply that it did. Mokyr (2002, pg. 87) suggests that successful development of a
new technique does not require understanding into the physical properties:
―Good mechanical intuition coupled to a sound experimental method was, up to a point, a good
substitute for formal science and helped James Watt to transform a crude and clumsy contraption into a
universal source of industrial power...But the epistemic base that could help analyze and explain the
efficiency of such engines did not exist. John Farey, the best expositor of the steam engine, still
regarded the steam engine in 1827 as a vapor-pressure engine rather than a heat engine.‖
The ability during this era to understand the fundamental aspects of a physical process meant that the
technician, inventor, scientist or engineer could actually approach a problem with an informed opinion
about the future results of their experimentation. The lens of ingenuity came into focus.
As a result, further improvements in engine design led to breakthrough levels of efficiency,
power and adoption in other industrial applications. Engines were notoriously inefficient prior to

15

Innovation, Markets, and Evolution

Watt's improvements. Von Tunzelmann et al(2000, pg. 193) attribute the price of coal as a major
determining factor in the diffusion of steam engines, resulting in geographical adoption patterns which
placed the Newcomen engine near cheap coal. Indeed, until subsequent efficiency boosting microinnovations, the steam engine remained co-located with coal mines that both fueled the engine and
required its pumping service. As engines increased in fuel efficiency the binding ties of costly fuel
administration were lessened, offering promise in locomotion, mechanization and electrical generation.

Culture and Technological Change
In Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, Nathan Rosenberg argues that culture
supported and encouraged innovation in Western Europe during its period of industrialization.
Rosenberg (1982, pg. 8) that Western Europe possessed ―a different kind of rationality;‖ particularly
complementary to the fundamentals of the capitalist mode of production. The willingness of Europe to
absorb and apply techniques from foreign social groups, Rosenberg (1982, pg. 12) suggests,
contributed greatly to the rate of innovation.
Rosenberg argues that the gradual replacement of institutions favoring the rule of law over the
arbitrary whims of an autocratic regime stabilized the perception of risk with respect to innovation. As
discussed previously, the decision to innovate takes place in a world of uncertainty. Since there are
costs associated with undertaking the effort to improve upon an existing process or to invent an entirely
new technique outright – existing processes can always be applied to a familiar problem with a
reasonable expectation regarding the outcome – it doesn’t seem unreasonable that shaky expectations
about the future might dissuade the inventor from taking such a risk.
Philosophy played a key role in creating the cultural backdrop for innovation. As John Dewey,
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in Philosophy and Civilization, argues that philosophy and culture remain systemically interconnected.
Dewey writes:
―Philosophy thus sustains the closest connection with the history of culture, with the succession of
changes in civilization. It is fed by the streams of tradition, traced at critical moments to their sources in
order that the current may receive a new direction; it is fertilized by the ferment of new inventions in
industry, new exploration of the globe, new discoveries in science. But philosophy is not just a passive
reflex of civilization that persists through changes, and that changes while persisting. It is itself a
change; the patterns formed in this junction of the new and the old are prophecies rather than records;
they are policies, attempts to forestall subsequent developments.‖

Dewey suggests an active role for philosophy in the process of cultural change. It has been
argued by Mokyr (2002, pg. 170) and Rosenberg (1982, pp. 8-12) that variations in religious
philosophy determine rates of technological change. Pointing to Lynn White's exhaustive comparison
of religions, Rosenberg (1982, pg. 8) points out that Christianity8 held ideals which were particularly
complementary to the needs of capitalism: objectification of labor, parsimony, a world-view that man
remains separate and distinct from nature. Most notably, the justification through Christianity – which
White terms ―the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen‖ - that humans enjoy eminent
domain over all trophic resources on Earth.
Religion aside, Enlightenment philosophers like John Locke and Francis Bacon espoused ideas
and values, which were both the cause and reflection of a culture of innovation. Institutions such as
private property, protection by law, enforceable contracts, free inquiry and enterprise serve to form
customs within a market paradigm.

8

White's Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis, contrasts Christianity, ancient
paganism, and pan-Asian religions.
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In a social system organized around market institutions and a culture which attaches ownership
to innovation, innovation then becomes more than just the means to the end of an improvement, but
rather an end of its own as a profit making endeavor. Indeed, culture develops artifacts which display
its symbols of virtue; in the case of the Industrial Revolution we have the yeoman tinkerer. This heroic
archetype beams the values of market success: ingenuity, boldness, craft, and thrift.
Our task remains to gain insight into the role of innovation in a modern market economy. This
section has sought to place innovation in an historical context, focusing primarily on the Industrial
Revolution. While this only begins to tell an interesting story about innovation, we have seen that
change in knowledge through the innovation of technique can never be reversed. The continuous dance
between the known set of useful knowledge and techniques which utilize such knowledge can become
unstable, and a virtuous cycle in knowledge generation amplifies to break free from the punctuated
equilibria of the previous period.
As applied to the Industrial Revolution, the relationship between propositional and prescriptive
knowledge can be divided into two phases: Before and after 1800. Prior to 1800 innovations suffered
from narrow, albeit widening epistemic bases. Following the amplifying effects of the Enlightenment
on the set of propositional knowledge, along with lower access costs, more macro-innovations emerged
to provide a basis for ongoing micro-innovation. A positive feedback cycle between useful knowledge
and innovation set off a dramatic explosion in technological and cultural change.
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Part 2: Social Structures of Accumulation and Innovation
Consistent with the larger theme of this study on the dynamic aspects of innovation in an
economic system, we must account for the change in the innovation process over time. The causal
feedback between culture and technology implies a continuous process of co-evolution. As technology
changes so does culture in a manner consistent with both the history of the previous relationship, but
the emergent state as well. Therefore, the processes that allow for the diffusion of innovation through
the economy at present are quite different than the process of a time absent of the new innovation. We
may then imply that with each subsequent innovation, diffusion leads to an increased level of systemic
complexity regarding the processes linking innovation to the market as a need to reconcile the impact
of new technology with old.
In a market system uncertainty about the future necessarily affects innovation. The process of
production for the market requires the investing entity to subject some portion of its balance sheet to
the immediate liquidity needs necessary to finance the wage bill and inputs before the gains of
production from revenue as a compensating asset. One consequence of the Industrial Revolution was
that an increasing share of the economy consisted of large scale, capital intensive industries.
Production on an industrial scale requires significant outlays of capital as well sophisticated, integrated
markets for products from the basest of raw inputs to refined finished good. Before a cent of profit
may be realized the entire process must be financed either through retained profits or credit, which
places the firm in the position to validate debts as they come due with revenues or stocks of money.
The decision to invest in the development of new technology weighs against perceptions of
one’s ability to meet liquidity requirements in the future. The level of liquidity preference becomes
more important as the period between investment and return are increased, due to the capital and time
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requirements to bring about a new, sophisticated technique. The needs of advanced capital must be met
by an accommodation in institutional organization capable of planning for its development and
commercialization. John Kenneth Galbraith shows in The New Industrial State that technological
innovation produces a tendency toward increasingly complex techniques and tools, which large
organizations best accommodate. Galbraith (1967, pg. 49) forcefully links the size of the firm to the
advent of technology:
―...Size is the general servant of technology, not the special servant of profits. The small firm cannot be
restored by breaking the power of the larger ones. It would require rather, the rejection of the
technology which since earliest consciousness we are taught to applaud. It would require that we have
simple products made with simple equipment from readily available materials with unspecialized labor.
Then the period of production would be short; the market would reliably provide the labor, equipment
and materials required for production; there would be neither possibility or need for managing the
market for the finished product...‖

While Galbraith's observation remains obvious, the implications are quite important.
Innovations resulting in a shift of production to capital intensive goods require a tremendous
commitment of time during which liquidity is surrendered. The need to plan arises in order to mitigate
the retarding effect on investment due to the perception that a risky, uncertain world will render the
firm unable to obtain the liquidity necessary to validate liability structures in the future 9. Planning can

9

Hyman P. Minsky, in “Stabilizing an Unstable Economy” argues that firms make
investment decisions based upon their ability to have the stocks or current inflows of
money necessary to cover the same period's outflow. Therefore, the risk that an asset
might lose value such that the liquidity necessary to “validate” the liability which
generates the outflows falls short. If credit cannot be obtained, then the asset is
sold and debt-deflation crisis emerges. In Part Four we shall go into further detail
regarding this approach and establish a linkage to innovation.
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only be effective at a scale of organization on the level of the modern corporation or the state.
Furthermore, the organization must plan for the development of a market for the good. The
commitment of considerable capital to the development of new product, with a long production period,
serves not current but future demand.
This section how the process of industrial innovation requires an institutional arrangement that
stabilizes perceptions of risk and promotes planning. We shall introduce Social Structure of
Accumulation Theory as a framework for understanding periods of relative stability with respect to the
conditions amenable to major investment in new capital formation. We attempt to show that SSAs
serve as an expectation-fixing force on the determination of subsequent innovation, enabling planning
processes. Furthermore, we discuss path dependence as a feature of SSAs and an expectation fixing
institution. Finally, we attempt to establish a fundamental relationship between planned market
activity against the institutional nexus of a social structure of accumulation. It shall be argued that
planned production for the market contributes significantly to the determination of path-dependent
innovation, and that the resultant ―paths‖ serve to stabilize the financial aspects of the SSA.
Social Structure of Accumulation Theory
In Contemporary Capitalism and its Crisis: Social Structure of Accumulation Theory for the
21st Century, Terrence McDonough, Michael Reich, and David M. Kotz (hereafter MRK,2010, pg. 1)
define SSAs as an effort to reconcile long-way cycles of capitalist growth with institutional change.
SSA theory attributes distinct periods of accumulation and stagnation to an holistic arrangement of
institutional factors, which provide periods of relative stability.

Such factors include legal

frameworks established in accordance with the rules governing jurisprudence. Future decisions are
based on earlier decisions, thereby carrying forward relics of history and placing them in the common
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experience.
Organized bodies of legitimate power serve as institutional control measures. For example,
official state governing bodies create agendas which establish funding priorities in an ongoing effort to
shape the course of investment. Private institutions ranging in influence from the local grange to the
US Chamber of Commerce, seek similar agendas and investment priorities.
Moreover, the particular network of institutional factors which constitute the SSA break down
over time, giving way to a period of stagnation and the dissolution of that particular structure. As the
market undergoes a new period of expansion and accumulation, a new SSA emerges to carry on in a
new period of relative stability.
McDonough et al (2010, pg. 2) explain that SSA theory rises from the need to reconcile some
key insights from Marxian and Keynesian macroeconomic approaches. In the former, McDonough et
al (2010, pg. 2) suggest that the Marxian theme of class conflict, most notably the struggle for power
between labor and capital, create uncertainty regarding the determination of profits.
SSA's Keynesian roots center on the importance of uncertainty. Keynes (2003, pg. 285)
stressed that expectations regarding the future determine the level of output and employment. We can
conceptualize this operationally by considering that, as Wray (1990, pg. 10) points out, money plays
the role of unit of account. It has been argued extensively by PK10 monetary theorists that money
cannot be neutral due to the fact that production must be financed in money denominated debts, subject
10

We shall offer a comprehensive treatment of the PK conception of money in the
next section. Chief proponents of this approach include Basil Moore, L. Randall
Wray, and the late Hyman P. Minsky. Additionally, Schumpeter can be associated
with the endogenous money approach due to his recognition that innovations must
be financed out of credit, since existing money flows were just sufficient to
satisfy the existing circular flow of goods. This point is made in The Theory of
Economic Development.
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to changing conditions in terms. An increase in liquidity preference results in insufficient levels of
effective demand. With liquidity preference determined by uncertainty institutional arrangements that
have a limiting effect stabilize conditions for investment. MRK (2010,pg. 3) suggest:
―When a social structure of accumulation is in place, many of the determinants of the profit rate
are secured, and long-run expectations of profitability are stabilized.‖
The Marxian theme of class conflict as an internal contradiction fits nicely as a determinant of
the profit rate in question, thereby linking it to the Kenyesian problem of uncertainty. Coupled with the
requirement to stabilize expectations regarding investment over a long period – where retained profits
or credit are required to finance innovation – SSA theory serves to explain how institutional
arrangements limit the destabilizing aspects of economic change.
Victor Lippet (2010, pp. 45-6) further defines SSA theory by explaining how institutions limit
perceived risk. Institutions – broadly defined to allow for customs, norms and habits of thought, while
retaining the narrow case of the individual organization11 - that work systemically to favor investment
serve as SSAs. As Lippet (2010, pg. 46) carefully disclaims, deductive proof of the stabilizing
function of SSAs is not possible. However, we may apply this framework to distinct periods of
capitalist growth. Looking at what SSA theorists (1996, Gordon, Weisskopf, and Bowles) 12 describe as
the Post-War WWII SSA we can see the stabilizing effect on profit expectations of the capital-labor
accord. In economic history, the capital-labor accord describes the post-war peace between labor and
11

12

Institutions in the narrow sense may have a well defined effect on the
broadly defined institutions of norm, custom and habit. For instance, the
financial system can be thought of as in institution by which the whole of
money convention rests. Norms relating the human experience to customs
involving money must be reconciled in the cultural sense in terms of the
Federal Reserve, Treasury, and the intermediary banking super-structure.
Courtesy to Lippet (2010, pg. 48) for the reference.
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capital. In exchange for fringe benefits, stability and cost of living pay increases labor would not strike
and the threaten the largest corporations with lost productivity. In exchange for higher labor costs
owners of the commanding heights of the economy enjoyed a period of stable expectations. Lippet
(2010, pg. 50) elaborates on the importance of the capital – labor accord in limiting risk:
― The capital-labor accord addressed one of the central contradictions in capitalist economies...capital
can be 'too strong' or 'too weak' relative to labor. If capital is too strong, wages will be kept down, but
that in turn threatens the maintenance of aggregate demand, leading to a potential crisis of under
consumption. Profits will be high in production, but sales will be curtailed by limited purchasing power,
discouraging new investment. On the other, if capital is too weak high wages will limit profitability by
raising production costs...‖

The balance of power between capital and labor proves useful as an example of the stabilizing
benefit of the SSA if we remind ourselves of the nature of innovation of technology, advancing in
technological complexity, in a market economy. Galbraith's 13 revelation that the long production
period and high capital requirements of progressively complex technology requires planning, provides
a background against which to place the importance of the capital-labor accord in supporting the PostWWII SSA. The ability to limit the riskiness of an investment by fixing, albeit loosely, the determinants
of cost, then the firm may make a calculated bet against the future. Likewise, the dominance of the
modern corporation in relation to the market allows for fixed expectations through the administration of
prices.
In an effort to establish a heterodox price theory, Fred Lee presents a model of pricing for the
market as administered by the modern business enterprise. Lee (1996, pg. 88) argues prices are

13

Quoted passage from New Industrial State
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administered by firms run by individuals or managerial committees. Lee suggests that established
procedures or processes that determine cost, depreciation, and output are administered by the managers
of the firm to the market. Furthermore, these procedures must comply with the institutional framework
set legislation. Laws which change how the existing tax structure affects the production process must
be factored into the price administration of firms.
The effect of price administration mirrors that of the cost stabilizing techniques, such as the
capital-labor accord, and allows for coherent planning. The ability to reliably administer prices and set
costs, allows the firm to predict its liability structures in the future, a critical determinant of liquidity
flows. Lee (1996, pg. 90) suggests that prices are set for periods of time based upon a production
cycle under which the inputs are financed. Furthermore, prices change over time as the cost of
production changes.
The ability of the firm to finance investment activity depends upon its size, power and access to
liquidity. As Hyman P. Minsky (1986, pp. 171-2) clearly lays out, firms must rely upon retained profits
or lines of credit to finance investment, since the revenues attributable to the resulting production
process from the investment flow exist only in the future, potentially. While a stream of revenue may
result from the investment commitment, the current wage bill must be met with an existing flow of
liquidity from any annuity. In the event that a firm wishes to embark upon a lengthy development of a
new process or product, one which lacks an existing market, they must do so in a manner which
minimizes the risk that the gains to commercialization of the innovation fail to outweigh the cost of
commitment of a new liability structure. It follows that as technology increases in capital intensity, its
diffusion requires a rather organized structure of planning and finance.
Path Dependence, Investment and Innovation
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In a market economy, inter-temporal flows of credits and debits are determined by the annuities
of both assets and liabilities. Contractual payment agreements based upon the expectation of future
income generated by production yields are sensitive to the risk that the underlying asset might fail to
maintain the stream of payments necessary for its validation. Therefore, investment which results in
path-dependent development, tightens the expectation that the stream of revenue generated will
validate the associated liability in the appropriate period. We further define path-dependence and work
to place it in context with the focusing aspect of social structures of accumulation.
We find in path dependence the ―unifying principle‖ needed to focus an emergent SSA. As an
institution, path dependence in any form that affects the flow of money over time may provide stability
to the SSA. Paul David's seminal contribution of Clio and Economics of QWERTY on the theory of
path dependence provides an analytical framework for understanding the innovation process within the
milieu of a social structure of accumulation. David (1985, pg. 332) argues the outcome of any
particular process may be heavily influenced by a non-local event(s) in time. The decision to invest in
one novel process over the other, especially one tied to a liability position in production finance, would
qualify as influential to the future course of investment decisions. When the diffusion of innovation
requires such a considerable level of capital, technology notwithstanding, a divergent subsequent
innovation proves costly.
David (1985, pg. 332-6) explains that the QWERTY keyboard arrangement emerged as an
engineering solution to the tendency for type-bar machines to jam when the end user typed too fast.
Additionally, the arrangement allows for the salesman to peck out the word ―typewriter‖ using only the
top row, reducing the likelihood that the demonstration might fail to impress the client. As
improvements in the design of the typewriter relaxed the physical constraint on typing speed,
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competing designs emerged. Despite the promise of enhanced efficiency and a more productive
clerical labor force, the QWERTY arrangement persists today due to self-reinforcing mechanisms that
approach an asymptotic state of ―lock-in.‖ This mechanism implies a degree of cost associated with the
decision to adopt an non-complementary standard to the prevailing technology that approaches the
path-dependent state.
David (1985, pp. 334-6) points to a range of costs associated with deviating from path
dependent innovation. The decision of a firm to purchase typing machines with the QWERTY
configuration creates a positive externality for the QWERTY trained labor force. The fact that
individuals need no retraining on operation of the typewriter, lowered the cost of adopting QWERTY
rather than selecting a different configuration. This early advantage carries a cascading effect on an
ever increasing probability that QWERTY keyboard will be selected in the future. We may extend this
example to say that markets integrated with a path-dependent production process provide a further
positive externality to any subsequent innovation that proves complementary. The self-reinforcing
mechanism of ―lock in‖ eventually approaches unity with respect to the probability that a future
innovation will complement the established path. The call and answer between a path-dependent
innovation and complementary adaptations, always emerging in response, can be thought of as a
process of co-evolution.
In an effort to bring the economy – a complex, evolving system – into a realm of analysis
suitable for explaining the dynamic nature of change, W. Brian Arthur (1988, pg. 209) argues that selfreinforcing mechanisms14 create ―a multiplicity of asymptotic states or possible emergent structures.‖

14

Arthur refines his definition of self-reinforcing mechanisms by offering a
host of synonyms that describe the same process: increasing returns;
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Positive feedback loops create emergent market structures that have outcomes along path-dependent,
asymptotic ―lock-ins‖ as a result of conditions in the early phases of its development.
Arthur (1988, pg. 210) suggests four likely causes for a state in which economic structure
undergo processes of self-reinforcement. First, and most notably, the large-scale capital requirements
of industrial production, wherein economies of scale generate a negative relationship between unit cost
and output. The increasing returns to scale inherent of large scale, organized production introduce a
selection bias favoring concentration among producers in the market. In order to validate the liability
structures associated with production on the scale that makes possible increasing returns, a significant
share of the total market is required for each firm. This introduces barriers to entry on the part of
latecomers or small firms, that cannot capture significant share of the market to facilitate production on
a scale that would generate sustained accumulation.
Arthur (1988, pg. 210) adds that learning and coordination effects, as well as adaptive
expectations each account for the presence of self-reinforcement. It is worth our time to cover some of
these aspects in further detail. Arthur (1988, pg. 210) accepts the argument by Arrow (1962) and
Rosenberg (1982) that learning effects serve to lower the cost of production of a given good through
innovations in production technique, thereby increasing the likelihood that the good viz-a-viz
substitutes will be selected in the market. Furthermore, learning effects attributable to continued
replication of a given production process may result in product improvements, increasing the
probability that its market shall remain.
Along similar lines of reason, coordination effects, suggests Arthur (1988, pg. 212), create

cumulative causation, deviation-amplification mutual causal processes;
virtuous and vicious cycles; threshold effects; and non-convexity.
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network externality that induce the ―going along‖ effect in selecting diffusion patterns. The benefits
that accrue commonly among widespread adopters of a path-dependent tool, technique or process
spring from a ―self-fulfilling prophecy‖ effect based upon a mutual expectation between consumer and
producer. In order to better demonstration the impact of coordination effects, let us examine a few case
examples where such effects yielded a path-dependent outcome in relationship to the determination of
subsequent innovation and the flow of investment.
The development of the railroad in the United States serves as a representative innovation under
conditions of self-reinforcement. First, the large-scale, capital-intensive nature of the railroad implies
increasing returns to scale. From 1839 to 1860 the extent of railroad networks throughout the economy
explodes from three to thirty thousand miles; a flow of investment to railroads over canals at a rate of
500%15. As the railroad spread through the economy, regions would benefit from the coordination
effects of selecting complementary standards in railroad construction.
Old localized track gauge standards, while once the result of an earlier ―lock-in‖ to one of many
equilibria, require a significant outlay of commitment of liquidity to adopt a different standard.
Mokyr 16 explains that despite the relative independence between rail lines, where some owned as much
as one thousand miles of track based upon a proprietary gauge, the increasing extent to which the
railroad was responsible for the transportation needs of the market overcame the cost of switching track
gauge. The cost according to Mokyr was indeed dear: in a coordinated effort, the Illinois Central shut
down normal operations on July 29, 1881 just long enough for a ready army of labor – a crew of three
thousand – to modify the track gauge along five-hundred forty-seven miles of the line. The maneuver

15
16

Source: Joel Mokyr, “Railroads and Nineteenth-Century American Economy
Ibid pg. 430
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successfully completed within the span of a single day!
We have shown that self-reinforcing forces steer the flow of investment towards path-dependent
processes and institutions. The expectation-fixing quality of an investment good, namely its ability to
lower the perception of risk, acts as a focusing device, a lever of influence on the formation of
institutions which together support a network of interdependence and stability. Social structure of
accumulation theory, frames the emergent phenomena that over time form the basis for the expectations
necessary to induce investment, capable of organizing the planning necessary in order to meet
established goals. The nature of innovation under these conditions becomes one of ―lock-in‖ to path
dependent states of punctuated equilibrium17.
This analysis has sought to integrate the role of money as a fundamental element of the social
structure of accumulation. Of central concern to the financier is the health and condition of the balance
sheet under which production is financed. The need to finance out of credit the necessary outlays for
the level of capital formation that is sufficient to result in an economy of scale, suggests that the course
of innovation in production processes must remain complementary to the underlying asset that
continues to validate the liability structure. In other words, investment tends to flow towards the
development of new techniques, products, and processes that reinforce the expectation that revenue
from future operations will continue to retire debts as they come due. In Part 4 we develop in greater
detail a framework by which we can place innovation in a monetary system of market production. Yet
for now, we proceed to our analysis concerning innovation and social change.

17

Stephen J. Gould
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Part Three: Innovation and Social Change
To explain the evolution of social systems requires a thoughtful consideration of the processes
which shape institutional innovation. The objective of this inquiry remains to establish a framework
wherein innovations in the realms of technology and of social structures, that direct the employment of
these ever changing material artifacts, connect to steer the course of human development, and the
subsequent creation of new conditions.
This section presents a model for social change which rests upon the philosophical insights of
the eminent pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey. Dewey insightfully presents a mode of inquiry
appropriate for complex, dynamical systems. The choice to employ Dewey as an intellectual guide in
this analysis stems from the recognition that as an open, evolutionary system of social provisioning,
observation of the forces of change acting on market processes must come from within. Dewey's
insistence that social problems be studied from a perspective of process has produced a number of
valuable insights which provide the basis for our evolutionary paradigm.
Dewey in The Quest for Certainty explains that the Greek mode of rational formalism 18 persists
in modern science and philosophy, despite its lack of relevance in light of the discovery of evolutionary
processes yielding in outcomes dependent on historical conditions 19. An ontology based upon pure and

18

19

Dewey predicates this argument on the assumption that the whole of Greek
thought and mysticism lie in the search to explain the stars as they were
heavenly bodies in the sky. The celestial ideal of these heavenly bodies
becomes one of perfect motion in unity. Immutable states of perfect
equilibrium.
This excerpt from The Quest for Certainty serves as the first part of the
second chapter titled, “The Great Philosophic Separation” in Joseph
Ratner's reader John Dewey's Philosophy. This work was part of the Modern
Library collection, circa 1939.

31

Innovation, Markets, and Evolution

immutable forms, the attainment of which becomes the ultimate human endeavor, reflects what Dewey
suggests as ―systemizations in rational form of the content of Greek religious and artistic beliefs.‖
While this study avoids approaches which aim to establish a model for equilibrium, which hails
from the Greek tradition, further consideration of Dewey's critique helps establish some background for
reflection on the problem of institutional innovation and course of future development Dewey (1939,
pg. 287) on the development of the Greek tradition offers: ―the belief that the divine encompasses the
world was detached from its mythical context and made the basis for philosophy, and it became also the
foundation of physical science.‖ Dewey goes on to point out that ―telling the story of the universe in
the form of rational discourse instead of emotionalized imagination signified the discovery of logic as a
rational science20‖
Logic, therefore, emerges as an example of institutional innovation. It arises as a new technique
in philosophical inquiry. As an institution, logic provides a focusing lens on the generation of potential,
future knowledge. The application of logic against the reflections of experience codifies the results in a
way that carries information about the past, and provides a basis for fixing mutually held expectations
throughout the social nexus. Furthermore, the evolution of institutions through time, constrained by
conventions based upon logic, produces adaptations toward a scientific end.
Following Dewey, it shall be argued that institutions change under processes that typically
exhibit path-dependent outcomes. Innovation of institutions heavily depends upon the influence of
prevailing, initial conditions which are shaped by historical conditions and outcome of previous
innovations. Moreover, institutions serve to filter and focus the information that flows through social
networks, the basis for subsequent diffusion of innovation. Therefore, social change through

20

Ibid
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institutional innovation remains constrained by path-dependence and suggests a high degree of positive
feedbacks within the system. Since the market operates based upon conventionally held expectations,
we must examine how these conventions emerge and persist. Paul David (pg. 205) argues that
institutions serve as path-dependent carriers of history. Through institutions the past is preserved and
continues to exert an influence over the course of future innovation.
This analysis proceeds with the argument that emergent phenomena resulting in institutional
change, must reconcile with the constraints of path-dependence as it relates to the extant set of
conditions. Therefore, the course of innovation reflects a persistent rigidity in culture, attributable to
self-reinforcement of social conventions. We begin with a consideration of David's application of
path-dependence theory to institutions.
According to David (pg. 290) systems possessing path-dependent processes suggest the
presence of ―non-ergodicity.‖ Simply defined, non-ergodic systems consist of processes that yield a
stochastic probability distribution sensitive to time. In other words, the likelihood of predicting the
future in the absence of historical information, based only upon current conditions as explanatory
variables, is impossibly low. David suggests:
―systems possessing this property... are unable to shake off the effects of past events and do not
have a limiting, invariant probability distribution that is continuous over the enter state space.‖
In plain terms, the events of the past play a direct role in forming the probability distribution at any
given time of a stochastic process. As time progresses the outcomes of each iteration depend more on
the consequences of previous iterations. Thus, institutional innovation acting as force for evolution
within the system, drifts toward a path-dependent outcome.
An analogy here might serve useful in our effort to drive home the importance attributed to non-
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ergodic systemic change. Imagine a river flowing through time. Let us suggest that the river
meanders, alternating in a serpentine pattern across a flat floodplain. At the closest scale of observation
manageable, we clearly see that suspended in the water, sediments float downstream as long as the flow
remains stable. Since the velocity of the flow is a function of the radius from the center of the bend and
the extent of the river, water flows slower closer to the inside of the bend relative to the outside. This
arrangement causes two things to happen simultaneously: 1) sediments to fall to the river bed near the
bank and 2) bank cutting by faster flows on the outside.
If we let time take on discrete segments as process iterations then we can see how the river
illustrates path-dependent change. With each iteration the probability that sediment falls or floats
depends increasingly on the outcome of the previous iteration. As the river drops sediment in one
instance it skews the probability distribution of the next iteration to favor the chance that similar
sediment will carry the trend. The far side evolution mirrors the near side just described, in that each
time sediment is carried away it increases the likelihood that the same will occur in the future. It has
eroded away sufficient material to increase the radius of the turn, thereby increasing the flow.
If we reversed each iteration, like peeling back the layers of an onion, we might find the once
straight river began the process of meandering flow from the minor obstruction of a rock in the stream.
The chance that the river will alter its direction of flow, ever so slightly to trigger serpentine flow, is
much like the ―accidents of history‖ that provide the early conditions to trigger self-reinforcement in
investment.
While the literature on path-dependence typically focuses on explaining why investment favors
a particular set of procedures, techniques or tools in the production of a good for the market, David (pg.
291) readily extends the theory to explain similar phenomena in institutional innovation. David (pg.
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219-292) argues that institutions guide individual behavior through conventionally held, mutually
consistent expectations. Furthermore, conventions follow a path-dependent course of innovation due to
their inherent need to stable expectations among a network of uncoordinated, dispersed agents.
Decisions by individuals are made in light of new information, yet shaped, constrained and formed by
the conventional wisdom of mutually consistent expectations. For David (pg. 291) conventions align
the expectations of a collective soup of individual agents along a mutually consistent lexicon of
understanding. While David applies this relationship to the problem of coordination games, we extend
this simple observation as a general pattern in the formation of networks connecting individuals within
groups.
The nexus of conventions of various degree and importance carries through time information
which describes the relationship of the individual to the group. Moreover, these networks of
conventional wisdom (e.g. mores, habits of thought, and customs) provide structure to pathways of
information flow within and between groups. As institutions evolve, the network in which institutions
exist adapts, necessarily changing the way information diffuses through the social nexus.
Networks perform a number of functions in the social system. First, they connect the
individuals within a group and allow the broadcast of information both at individual and collective
levels of experience. In the former, individuals reflecting upon personal experience may transmit such
information to the public sphere. The latter of course provides the basis for reflection against which
mutually consistent expectations provide structure to individual decisions.
Second, networks serve to shape the flow of information through the social system. Due to
technical, physical or institutional constraints the diffusion of new information through the network
tends to exhibit a bias towards information that is best suited for transmission through the network.
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This brings forth a rather important implication regarding the nature of innovation among social
institutions. Established networks along groups of individuals that interact together in a larger social
system, are further reinforced by the relative ease with which institutional innovation is supportive of
the existing order flows through the network.
The abstract nature of institutional innovation as an iterative process of information diffusion
through social networks, benefits greatly by rooting the implicit theoretical constructs in real world
examples. Let us suppose that a little league baseball game sets the stage for a simple network.
Networks emerge as the potential pathways for the exchange of information between the individual and
group. As the proud parents of the little leaguer participate in the social activities generally associated
with such an event – cheering, conspicuous consumption, side conversation, physical expression –
there exist a number of processes underway which account for the function of the network. In
accordance with custom and convention, parents communicate information regarding their experience
of the event to the rest of the group by way of the network. Cheering is heard by others in the
immediate vicinity. Since cheering carries the precedence of acceptance, and is generally
complementary of the network that transmits the inherent information, then its subsequent diffusion
through the network reinforces the convention. Additionally, the network remains constrained by the
physical constraints implied by geographical coincidence. In order for the network to emerge, the
parents of these child athletes must collect in a common location. The network associated with the
little league game, therefore only exists during a game.
Observation of common modes of conveyance yields further insight into the geographical
nature of some social networks. When vehicles drive down the freeway a network emerges that
connects the individual driver with a larger group of drivers, through the relay of observed billboards.
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Again, the network is physically constrained by the geographical limits of billboard placement around a
freeway, the speed of travel along the highway, and conventional wisdom held to be mutually
consistent within a group of drivers. Hence, information in this network tends to flow unilaterally, as
drivers must passively consume the information conveyed by the billboards due to the obvious limits of
operating a motor vehicle. The mode of ―broadcast communication‖ where information predominately
flows through the network, where immediate critique and response is limited or non-existent, implies a
degree of asymmetry in institutional innovation, which biases subsequent changes in the network
towards information inherent in the existing order. In other words, the information broadcast in
roadside advertisements is selected not based upon equilibrating forces selecting information on the
basis of meaning or importance, but the whims of a powerful vested interest in the social structure of
accumulation.
One implication of path-dependent evolution in social institutions is the possibility that some or
certain groups become more powerful than others over time. Recent research in the science of social
networks suggests a high degree of asymmetry with respect to power and influence, which serves to
reinforce divisions between groups and place some in position of higher influence than others.
Nicholas Christakis and James Fowler employ social network analytical techniques to analyze the
effect of group dynamics over time. Christakis and Fowler (2007, 2008, 2009) find that individuals
acting as ―central nodes‖ exert influence through the network, up to an average of three degrees of
separation. Moreover, central nodes have a higher than average likelihood of influencing the behavior
of non-central nodes, suggestive of self-reinforcing dynamics.
While contributions of Christakis and Fowler focus on explaining how
seemingly personal decisions regarding health (smoking, poor diet, etc) spread
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through social networks, they insist that dynamical network analysis applies to a
wide range of social phenomena, including the innovation of institutions over time.
Fowler and Jeon (2007) apply network analysis in an effort to explain the evolution
of Supreme Court decisions over time.

Using a sample of 30,288 majority opinions

from the bench, a network connecting citations between 1754 and 2000 shows a
pattern of stare decisis.

According to Fowler and Jeon (2007, pp. 16-29) legal

institutions evolve in a manner that reinforces stare decisis, latin for “stand by
decisions.”

Courts honor the majority decision of a case, which serves to lock

the law into a state of legal path-dependence.
The rigidness implied by institutional “lock-in” in legal precedence
suggests that over time, asymmetrical effects of the law across the network with
respective to the distribution of power, may become institutionalized.

In the

capitalist system of monetary production, money flows through nodes of central
influence established by institutionalized and asymmetrical legal protection.
Similarly, relative influence depends upon access to money, creating a mutually
reinforcing relationship.

38

Innovation, Markets, and Evolution

Part 4: Innovation and the Monetary System of Production
Previous sections of this analysis claim that money serves as a determinant in the
process of systemic evolution. Money possesses special properties that establish its dominance in
relation to other institutions within the economic system. First and most importantly, money performs
the task of linking the future with the present in terms of the material goods of society through the
establishment of contracts. The use of contracts in the functioning of a market system based upon
private property is so ubiquitous it hardly warrants mention. However, the recognition that money
performs the duty of the contract instrument - the job of linking the future with the present - remains a
profound revelation, that any theory that seeks to reconcile money and real production should not
overlook.
The use of contracts ranging in formality from an informal handshake to formal, legally binding
agreements, arises from the desire to attenuate the risk associated with an uncertain future. When an
individual trades some portion of her current income for a contract vehicle that entitles her to a future
stream of income, it emerges from the fear that her current income in the future will fail to satisfy some
desired level of consumption in the future. Of course, the individual level of risk aversion determines
in large part what portion of current consumption flows towards savings. However, in the aggregate
varying perceptions of risk on the part of households, firms, and financial institutions determine the
level of investment in the economy, ceteris paribus.
Uncertainty about the future state of one’s material well being is a central problem in
economics. L. Randall Wray (1990, pg. 11) observes that fear of the unknowable future is central to
Keynes’ monetary theory. The liquidity enjoyed by holding cash provides a feeling of safety; fear of
the unknown may overwhelm the need to place money in a productive position of investment.
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Part two of this paper argued that technological innovation emerging from the Industrial
Revolution increased the scale of industry in order to accommodate the needs of large, capital intensive
production. Production on an industrial scale increases the period between investment and return to
such a degree that the inputs to production must be financed. The establishment of a contract for
payment between the banker and the firm connects the institution of money to innovations, by
promoting only changes that improve the monetary position of the firm. The banker has little interest
in breaking the rents of its chief customers, increasing the risk of default. This section aims to make
explicit the link between credit, money and the production process.
This section argues that in a market system of production, money takes on the special role as the
institutional guide by which innovations diffuse through the economy. Furthermore, money becomes
the subject of innovation itself as it undergoes a process of co-evolution with the market. In support of
these claims we adopt the endogenous money approach of the post-Keynesian school. The postKeynesian conception of money presents a useful analytical tool for explaining the behavior of markets
under the uncertainty of time. The emphasis on how money flows through an uncertain world
integrates with the overall historical approach of this inquiry.
This section sets out to establish the endogenous money approach as an appropriate theoretical
tool for explaining production in capitalist markets. Next, we attempt to connect the contractual
property of money to the process of innovation and argue the flow of money shapes subsequent
evolution of the system. Finally, we examine the mechanisms under which money adapts in response
to changes in the institutional framework of the market.
Endogenous Money and the Capitalist Mode of Production
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Keynes emphasized the economy as a system of monetary production. Wallace Peterson (1996,
pg. 151) argues that in contrast to the premise that money is neutral, Keynes integrates money as an
endogenous element of ―modern systems of market capitalism,‖ suggesting a non-neutral role. As an
embedded institution, money touches every aspect of the production process. Performing the
accounting function in a system of private contracts, money becomes an instrument acceptable to settle
debts universally (Wray 1990, pg. 8). Therefore, the production process seeks to establish a flow of
money for the sake of settling a debts.
Following from the revelation that modern capitalist markets rest upon a system of monetary
production, the post-Keynesian school analyzes the way money enters the economy endogenously.
Wray (1990, pg.14) defines money as:
―...the terms in which debts are written; it is the unit of account; it is the balance sheet item
created as part of a forward contract. Thus, money is a stock created to facilitate flows.‖
Rather than developing from the barter system, Wray (1990, pg. 9) suggests that money emerges as
property is created, as a means of accounting for contractual flows of property through time.
Money and Innovation
Schumpeter, Keynes and chief proponents of the PK monetary approach attribute to the
financial system a significant share of the decision to invest. Schumpeter (2008, pg. 74) argues that the
banker, ―stands between those who wish to form new combinations and the possessors of productive
means.‖ In other words, the entrepreneur must submit to the banker in order to integrate an innovation
into the production process. Minsky (1986, pg 224) offers that in the modern financial system, banks
expand their balance sheets in order to lend for the sake of investment. Furthermore, the firms ability
to meet its contractual obligations as they come due, ―depends upon the quasi-rents that capital assets
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earn when used in production,‖ (Minsky 1986, pg. 224). The relationship between debtor and creditor
ultimately hinges upon balance sheet positions in which the creditor exert influences, albeit indirectly,
over the formation of means of production.

Furthermore, as an increasing share of output throughout

the economy requires the extension of credit from the financial system, the goals of each entity –
producers and bankers – grow together in a symbiosis, each mutually supporting the needs of the other.
Minksy (1986, pg. 228) suggests that ―because bankers live in the same expectational [sic] climate as
businessmen, profit-seeking bankers will find ways to accommodate their customers.‖
Against the notion that credits and debits flow inter-temporally through the balance sheets of
firms and banks, arises the pervasive phenomena of existential uncertainty. As Wray (1990, pp. 8-9)
notes, private property destroys the collective safety net of surplus; the future must be secured not by
individual rather than social contracts. In each period, the need to ensure a steady flow of quasi-rents
or profits dominates the production process, rendering it subordinate to the end goal of accumulating
money. With the advent of the large corporation as the dominant institution in the US
economy and an integrated network of financiers supporting its hegemony, the manner of innovation as
it relates to the social system of production serves to reinforce the status quo, rather than invoke the
―perennial vale of creative destruction21.‖
The Evolution of Money
Wray (1990, pp. 2-14) illustrates that money emerges with the institution of private property,it
predates markets and serves as the unit of account of essentially a ―wheat now for more wheat later
proposition.22‖ Money as the contract vehicle for inter-temporal trade of private property, as well as

21

Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development

22

Wray uses the analogy of wheat to demonstrate the contractual nature of a market based
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claims to the flows of revenue associated with such property, undergoes iterations of innovation. Wray
points to Keynes' argument in The General Theory that each commodity carries an ―own-rate‖ of
interest – or a premium by which the holder parts with some portion of it – and that over time
commodities of lowest ―carrying cost‖ emerge to account for the purpose of universal credit-debit
clearance. Thus, history shows that money evolves through time to perform the role as unit of account;
the universally accepted means of retiring debt. At earlier stages in history, grain served as unit of
account, later precious metal, and now credit money based upon state debt.
Money continues to serve as the object of innovation. Minksy (1986, pp. 225-7) argues that
bankers constantly seek new instruments which serve the purpose of retiring debt. Due to institutional
constraints, such as attempts by the Federal Reserve of restricting the behavior of intermediary banks
through interest rate targets, banks come under tremendous pressure to supply the money necessary to
validate a complex network of interdependent balance sheets. Moreover, the internal logic of the
capitalist mode of production requires an ever increasing supply of money in order to sustain the open
process of pecuniary accumulation.
Aside from the systemic need to supply funds for the sake of production and for the validation
of maturing debts, there exists a predatory aspect to the banking system that exerts pressure on banks to
development new liabilities to issue, thus promoting growth. At the heart of the banking motive lives
the desire of the bank managers to accumulate ―personal fortunes‖, a wholly separate function from the
traditional purpose of extending credit to credit worthy customers. Minsky (1986, pg. 238) argues:
―The typical professional bank president is not a rich man when he starts his career. As a bank president

upon private property, where risk premiums associated with the uncertainty of lending “wheat” to
another individual account for the time lapse in which the wheat is no longer immediately available
to the lender. The contract in wheat becomes a debt which takes on the properties of money.
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he is a hired hand trying to achieve a personal fortune. But given the tax structure, it is difficult to
accumulate a fortune by saving out of income; the most efficient route for a business executive is by
way of stock options and the capital gains that accrue as the stock market price per share rises. As
holders of stock options, bank management is interested in the price, on the exchanges, of their bank's
shares.‖

In the banking sector the price of a stock depends highly upon the size of the bank in terms of market
capitalization and coverage. The larger the bank, the higher the price. Bank managers wishing to
maximize individual hoards of money, promote activities which increase the balance sheets of their
financial institutions.
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Conclusion
Throughout this study we attempt to establish innovation as a function of an evolutionary social
system. Groups of individuals form networks that organize and direct the productive activities of the
social system, shaping the emergent state in a manner complimentary to the existing order. We set out
to reconcile innovation - as it relates to a complex, dynamical system - with the structure of the very
networks that embed each institution in an interdependent social fabric. Like a thread, the institution of
money weaves through the social system, connecting groups and individuals in a global market.
Social network analysis in the fields of medicine and computational social science suggest
―nodes‖ of power and influence scattered throughout the social system, which act as relays in the
transmission of information, most notably cultural signals. To act as the node implies a degree of
centrality in one's personal relationship network. Not all agents in the network are created equal in
terms of power. Rather, influence within the network reinforced and magnified by self-reinforcing
mechanisms common to evolutionary systems. In our social system of monetary production, money's
role as the unit of account by which all debts are settled, only strengthens its power over time.
We framed our analysis from an historical perspective to highlight the interplay between the
extant and emergent system states. Veblen's ―habitual method of procedure‖ refers to the extant
structure of the system; the rigidness of path-dependent institutions. The emergent arise from the
material consequences of historical developments. The bias in probability to the sort of change in
institutions and technology that preserves historical procedures provides rigidity to the system. Path
dependence in all manner of innovation gives structure to the social system. Thinking about the
economy as part of a social system that evolves through historical time highlights the irreversible
nature of change. So called, ―accidents of history‖ determine in large part the long-term path of
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innovation. Path-dependence literature suggests that a system can ―lock-in‖ to an arbitrary vector of
evolution. The past persists in the memory of the system; some institutions and techniques persistent
through history.
The institution of money arises from the emergence of private property. We argue that in a
social system that relies on markets as its production and provisioning mechanism, money ties all
elements of the system in one common network. In systems of production where discrete segments of
time require payment in money on debts, pecuniary gains become the end of society; money becomes
the subject of innovation.
This paper has emphasized the process of change. Starting with the Industrial Revolution we
begin to tell a story about the continuous nature of change in the economy. We adopt Mokyr's
knowledge which describes a feedback between propositional and prescriptive knowledge. The
Industrial Revolution can be described as an explosive period in innovation, where major
breakthroughs in science were met with ingenious application to the physical world. Mokyr's
frameworks suggests that the relation of propositional to prescriptive knowledge post 1800 set off a
positive feedback in innovation – some innovations caused the base of propositional knowledge to
increase, further increasing the chance of an addition to the set of prescriptive knowledge. The
telegraph comes to mind as a technological change that extended access to more individuals the real of
science.
Consequential to the tremendous investment in fixed capital during the Industrial Revolution we
have an increase in the need for organized economic planning. Galbraith makes the point, as the ―...Size
is the general servant of technology‖ which increases the need to prepare the market for production. Planning
becomes necessary in order to stabilize profits versus costs, and to prepare the market for future consumption.
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This analysis has argued that SSA theory presents a powerful analytical tool for explaining the nature of
organizational planning for market production. Furthermore, we propose that path-dependence serves as an
expectation-fixing device – a cultural artifact that smooths expectations regarding the volatility of the future.

Out of an evolutionary framework we view the social system of production as
yet sometimes viscous, but always changing.

fluid,

By taking the long view on the subject

of economic change, we see the effect of power and tradition in the application of
Homo sapiens' most unique trait:

the power to bend our constraints just a little

further in an act of defiance against the odds of extinction.

And through the

recognition that convention and social pressure shape the course of our collective
efforts to persist, we hope to approach the problem of social policy informed, and
ready to innovate.
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